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Abstract—Selfish mining is a well known vulnerability in
blockchains exploited by miners to steal block rewards. In
this paper, we explore a new form of selfish mining attack
that guarantees high rewards with low cost. We show the
feasibility of this attack facilitated by recent developments in
blockchain technology opening new attack avenues. By outlining
the limitations of existing countermeasures, we highlight a need
for new defense strategies to counter this attack, and leverage
key system parameters in blockchain applications to propose
an algorithm that enforces fair mining. We use the expected
transaction confirmation height and block publishing height
to detect selfish mining behavior and develop a network-wide
defense mechanism to disincentivize selfish miners. Our design
involves a simple modifications to transactions’ data structure in
order to obtain a “truth state” used to catch the selfish miners
and prevent honest miners from losing block rewards.
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain technology has many applications, such as cryp-
tocurrencies [5], [13], [16], smart contracts [3], [11], Internet
of things [10], [18], health care [8], [15], and supply chain
management [6]. Blockchain applications use a constantly
evolving distributed ledger that is capable of developing con-
sensus in a decentralized environment. As the name suggests,
a blockchain is a sequence of data blocks that are cryptograph-
ically chained to one another through one-way hash function.
With the help of these mathematical constructs, blockchains
employ an append-only model to prevent data tempering and
preserve uniform consensus among peers in the network.
Despite these promising capabilities, blockchains are vul-
nerable to a series of attacks that evolve from its design
constructs, its underlying peer-to-peer network, and the ap-
plications that make use of this technology. Some of the
well known attacks on blockchains include the selfish mining
attacks [7], block withholding attacks [12], the majority attack
[2], distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks [17], among
others. The feasibility of each attack in blockchain applica-
tions varies depending on the network topology, adversarial
requirements, peer behavior, and incentives. For example, in
cryptocurrencies, it is more feasible to launch DDoS attack
to exploit block size than to launch the 51% attack [1]. Per
Baqer et al. [1], the block size can be exploited by choking
the network by excessively generating low-cost transactions.
On the other hand, to launch the 51% attack, an adversary
needs to acquire more than 50% of network’s hash rate to
permanently gain control over the system.
Selfish mining is one such an attack that is considered to
be infeasible in practice due to centralization of the mining
pools, and the potential diminishing returns. However, in this
paper, we argue that selfish mining may be more viable
than commonly believed, and so the existing countermeasures
are insufficient to prevent selfish mining attacks. We draw
attention towards recent developments in the blockchain sys-
tems that have opened new attack avenues for selfish miners.
Attackers may lease sufficient hash rate from online services to
combine 51% attack with selfish mining and compromise the
blockchain applications without being detected. In this paper,
we also describe a threat model that partakes these new attack
opportunities with a baseline attack procedure. We supplement
our analysis by outlining the existing countermeasures and
highlighting their limitations. We then propose a new scheme
that utilizes a design combining various blocks of the prior
solutions and provide more effective defense against selfish
mining. We evaluate the workings of our model in light of
our threat model and varying attack conditions. Our proposed
scheme is effective in detecting the behavior of a selfish miner
and encourages the network to discard his efforts.
Contributions. In this paper, we make the following contribu-
tions. 1) We describe a new form of selfish mining attack by
outlining developments of new attack avenues in blockchain
community with guaranteed rewards. 2) We empirically estab-
lish the feasibility of this attack by comparing high revenue
guarantees with low attack cost. 3) We outline the limitations
of simple and existing countermeasures and propose a new
scheme for deterring selfish mining and promoting honest
mining practices. 4) We validate our design effectiveness under
varying attack conditions and against adaptive attackers.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
In section II, we review the prior work done to explore
selfish mining and its countermeasures. In section III, we
outline the problem statement and preliminaries of our work.
In section IV, we describe the threat model and the attack
procedure. In section V, we present our scheme of countering
selfish mining, followed by concluding remarks in section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Selfish mining in blockchains was identified by Eyal and
Sirer [7], who demonstrated that mining protocols are not
incentive-compatible and selfish miners may compromise the
system and obtain higher rewards than their due shares. They
used a state machine to outline the benefits of selfish mining
to malicious miners. As a countermeasure, they proposed a
random selection scheme at fork instance to disincentivize
the selfish miner. However, in random block selection, the
honest miner is equally likely to lose its block during fork
and there is no guarantee that the honest miner will win under
race conditions. Heliman [9], proposed a “Freshness Preffered”
(FP) technique in which blocks with recent timestamp are
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Fig. 1. Expected and actual time of blocks published in Ethereum. The non-
unifrom delay can be due to varying hash rate or network churn.
preferred over old blocks. In FP, when a node is presented with
blocks of an honest miner and a selfish miner, it selects the
most recent blocks as identified by their timestamps. Although
this is an effective technique to spot selfish mining behavior,
the information flow in a peer-to-peer network is not always
fair and unexpected delays in the propagation of honest blocks
may favor the selfish miner.
Solat et al. [19] introduced Zeroblock, where miners are
forced to release their blocks within an expected time. If the
miners withhold their blocks for selfish mining and do not
broadcast them within the expected time, the peers in the
network create their own dummy blocks and append them
to their blockchains. However, Zeroblock is not sustainable in
varying hash rate of the network when the difficulty parameter
is constant. Expected time of blocks may incur high variance
due to hash rate fluctuations which, under Zeroblock, may
invalidate valid blocks. In Figure 1, we plot the normalized
values of expected block time and the actual block time in
Ethereum. Due to varying hash rate or network latency, there
is an expected delay in the actual block time which will
result in invalidation of valid blocks in Zeroblock. Moreover,
appending dummy blocks in blockchain creates an additional
overhead on the blockchain size, which has reached beyond
163 GB and 450 GB in Bitcoin and Ethereum, respectively.
Another method to combat selfish mining involves comparing
timestamps of transactions in blocks of honest and selfish
miners to discover selfish mining behavior. However, miners,
as part of the standard practice, prioritize transactions based
on fee. Aware of such countermeasures, a selfish miner may
include recent transaction of low fee in his block and win the
race against an honest miner who mines old transactions with
high fee. Also, an adaptive attacker can include fewer or no
transactions in his block to avoid the timepstamp checking
and still succeed in the attack. Therefore, there is a need for
an effective deterrence mechanism to accurately distinguish
between adaptive selfish and honest mining.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND PRELIMINARIES
Over the years, only one selfish mining attack has been
reported on a Japanese cryptocurrency called Monacoin. Such
low prevalence of selfish mining in blockchains can be as-
cribed to the low probability of success, high attack cost, and
low returns. Once a selfish miner finds a competing block in
his private chain, he is forced into a race condition in which
he competes with the hash rate of the rest of the network to
extend his private chain before anyone else appends a block
on the main blockchain. As such, the probability of finding
a block before the rest of the network becomes a function of
selfish miner’s hash rate and the aggregate hash rate of the
network. To illustrate that, let the probability of success for
the selfish miner be P (s). Let z be the number of blocks that
the selfish miner wants to append to his private chain, α be
the fraction of selfish miner’s hashing power, and γ be the
fraction of remaining hashing power, where α + γ = 1. The
success probability of selfish miner can then be defined as:
P (s) =
{
1 , α > γ(
α
γ
)z
, α < γ
(1)
With low hash rate, a selfish miner may not succeed in
launching an attack and is likely to lose the block rewards to
the honest miner. To be able to win the race condition with
guaranteed returns, the selfish miner needs at least 51% hash
rate to succeed before the rest of the network finds a block. A
combination of the 51% attack and the selfish mining attack
will ensure selfish miner’s monopoly over the blockchain.
However, this strategy has two caveats. First, purchasing
hardware to acquire a majority of hash rate in a major Bitcoin
is expensive; the mining industry has moved from inexpensive
CPU and GPU mining to sophisticated ASIC mining chips that
are expensive. Second, as the 51% hash rate gives the attacker
complete control over the network, it can easily be noticed by
the network entities and they may discard all blocks published
by the selfish miner. Due to these limitations, selfish mining
attacks have not been observed frequently in blockchains.
However, we have noticed recent developments in the Bit-
coin market that might facilitate selfish mining in disguise, and
prevent peers in the network from discovering such fraudulent
activity. Online hashing services, such as NiceHash, have
emerged to outsource hashing power to the miners on hourly
basis [14]. A selfish miner may rent up to 50% hashing power
of a target Bitcoin for a short period of time and carry out
successful selfish mining attack. In that case, the attack cost
will be the money paid to NiceHash, and rewards will be the
block rewards once the private chain is accepted. To calculate
the profit of launching such an attack, let b be the block time
of a Bitcoin in minutes, r be the block reward for publishing a
block, and c be the cost of renting 50% hash rate of the Bitcoin
for one hour. Then, the profit p for launching a successful
attack of z blocks on that Bitcoin can be computed as:
p = (z × r)−
(
z × b× c
60
)
(2)
Using (2), we calculate the cost to launch a successful
attack of two blocks in the top six cryptocurrencies, reported
in Table I. Notice that for each cryptocurrency, the block
reward is always greater than the attack cost. To launch this
B1 B2 B3 BH
Bs1 Bs2
B1 B2 B3
BH
Bs1 Bs2
Fig. 2. An illustration of baseline selfish mining attack in which the selfish miner forks the blockchain. In the start, the honest miner publishes BH , which
is accepted by the network to elongate the chain. At the same time, the selfish miner computes BS1 and BS2 , and forks the blockchain at B3. The parent
block of BH and BS1 is B3. Once forked, the network discards BH and adapts to the longer chain. As a result, the selfish miner succeeds.
TABLE I
ATTACK COST REQUIRED AND PROFIT MARGIN EARNED IN A SELFISH
MINING ATTACK OF TWO BLOCK ON FIVE MAJOR CRYPTOCURRENCIES.
HERE, CAP DENOTES THE MARKET CAP IN USD, COST DENOTES THE
ATTACK COST (USD), AND PROFIT DENOTES THE MINIMUM PROFIT
EARNED THROUGH BLOCK REWARDS (USD).
SYSTEM CAP HASH RATE COST PROFIT
BITCOIN 112.7B 35,604 PH/s 81K 69K
ETHEREUM 49.5B 222 TH/s 1.50K 1.6K
B.CASH 14.9B 5,023 PH/s 11.30K 5.4K
LITECOIN 5.7B 327 TH/s 0.13K 3.6K
DASH 2.1B 2 PH/s 0.13K 1.4K
MONERO 2.3B 365 MH/s 0.10K 0.9K
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Fig. 3. Profit P earned by launching a selfish mining attack of length z blocks
on top six cryptocurrencies. Notice that secondary y-axis is used for Bitcoin
because its Profit margins were high compared to the other cryptocurrencies.
attack with a longer private chain, the attacker needs to acquire
NiceHash services for a longer duration, which might be more
costly and may risk exposing the behavior selfish miner. In
Figure 3, we show the profit margins of selfish mining for
six cryptocurrencies against the length of the private chain of
the attacker z. Notice that the rewards for Bitcoin and Bitcoin
Cash are greater than other cryptocurrencies. Their average
block time is 10 minutes, which provides more sustainable
attack window compared to Ethereum which has an average
block time of 15 seconds. Furthermore, it is interesting to note
that the second biggest cryptocurrency network, Ethereum, has
low rewards and higher attack cost compared to the smaller
cryptocurrency Litecoin.
IV. THREAT MODEL AND ATTACK PROCEDURE
For our threat model, we assume a selfish miner capable of
mining two or more blocks in race conditions. The aim of the
selfish miner is to compute valid blocks and withhold them in
a private chain to generate a fork against an honest miner. As
a result, the attacker would want the network to switch to its
longer private chain and discard the block of the honest miner.
For that to happen, the attacker would want its private chain
to be at least one block longer than the main blockchain to be
able to convince the network for a longer proof-of-work and
convince them to switch. On the other hand, we assume that
the honest miner will follow the conventional mining practices,
and will prioritize transactions based on their mining fee. He
will try to include as many transactions in the block as possible
to gain both block and fee rewards. Furthermore, the honest
miner will not withhold his block and will timely broadcast it
to the network upon computation.
A. Baseline Attack
The baseline attack procedure involves a selfish miner
producing two blocks, BS1 and BS2 , and forking the main
blockchain to invalidate honest miner’s block BH . The attacker
rents 50% hash power of Bitcoin from NiceHash for 10
minutes. The attack sequence follows two rounds. In the first
round, the attacker computes a first block, BS1 , using his own
hashing power. It then withholds the block and observes the
honest miner’s block BH being accepted by the network.
In the second round, the attacker uses the rented hash
power to compute the next block BS2 before anyone else in
the network. Once the block is computed, the attacker forks
the main blockchain with its private chain as illustrated in
Figure 2. As a result, the network switches to the forked private
chain of the selfish miner and discards the block of the honest
miner. The selfish miner succeeds in the attack and wins more
rewards than the cost incurred in the attack.
V. COUNTERMEASURES
To counter this attack, we introduce the notion of "truth
state" for blocks at the fork instant to identify selfish mining
behaviors. We append a parameter of “expected confirmation
height” in the data structure of a transaction. In blockchains,
the height of the block is the index number that denotes its
position in the chain. A new block adds the height of the
chain by factor of 1. Expected confirmation height is the index
TABLE II
LIST OF NOTATIONS USED IN THIS PAPER
SM
def
= Selfish miner
HM
def
= Honest miner
FS
def
= State of Fork
NS
def
= Normal State
Sstate
def
= Truth state for selfish miner
Fstate
def
= Future state for selfish miner
Hstate
def
= Truth state for honest miner
n
def
= Total blocks computed by selfish miner
BSi
def
= Selfish miner’s blocks, where i = {1, 2, . . . , n}
XSi
def
= Height of each block BSi , where i = {1, 2, . . . , n}
BH
def
= Honest miner’s block
YH
def
= Height of BH
p
def
= Total number of transactions in BSi
Txj
def
= Transaction in BSi , where j = {1, 2, . . . , p}
E(Txj)
def
= Expected confirmation height of Txj
q
def
= Total number of transactions in BH
Tyk
def
= Transaction in BH , where k = {1, 2, . . . , q}
E(Tyk)
def
= Expected confirmation height of Tyk
number of a future block in which the transaction is likely to
be mined, and it depends upon the transaction size, the mining
fee, and the size of the memory pool. The mining fee and the
transaction size assign a priority factor to the transaction. The
priority factor shows the incentive for a miner to select the
transaction for his block. If the mining fee is high and the
transaction size is small, miners are more inclined to prioritize
that transaction for their block. Memory pool in blockchains
is a repository that caches unconfirmed transactions. If the
memory pool size is large, it creates a transaction backlog
and pending transactions have to wait to be mined.
In Bitcoin, for example, an online service called “Earn” uses
Monte Carlo simulation techniques to predict the expected
confirmation height of a transaction with 90% confidence
interval [4]. Their simulation parameters take the backlog of
transactions, the fee priority of the miners over the last three
hours, and the rate of the incoming transactions as inputs.
Based on these parameters, Earn predicts the expected confir-
mation height and the expected delay for a given transaction.
This prediction algorithm can also be applied on the software
client of the users so that once a user generates a transaction,
its software client can calculate the expected confirmation
height of the block and append it to the transaction before
broadcasting it to the network. Under standard mining, the
transaction will likely be mined in the target block with 90%
confidence. Thus, the average expected confirmation height of
all transactions in the target block will be equal to the actual
block height. This can be used to assign a “truth state” to the
block and further be used to catch selfish miners who deviate
from the standard mining. In the following, we elaborate on
our design. We list notations in Table II, and provide the
Algorithm 1: Detecting Selfish Mining Behavior
State: Fork on blockchain FS
Inputs: BSi , BH ;
1 Sstate = XSn −
(
∑p
j=1E(Txj))
p
; // Truth state
for selfish miner
2 Fstate = XS1 −
(
∑p
j=1E(Txj))
p
; // Future
state for selfish miner
3 Hstate = YH − (
∑q
k=1E(Tyk))
q
; // Truth state
for honest miner
4 if (Hstate < Sstate or Fstate < 0 ) then
5 Reject BSi ; // Reject selfish miner
6 else
7 (Hstate > Sstate ) ; // Circumvention
8 Asize = 0
9 foreach p ∈ BSi do
10 Asize = Asize+ p ; // Compare number of
transactions
11 if (q >
Asize
n
or Asize = 0 ) then
12 Reject BSi ; // Reject if
transactions size is small
13 else
14 Accept BSi ;
State: Normal State NS
description of our design in algorithm 1.
A. Selfish Mining Detection
In the light of our threat model and baseline attack (sec-
tion IV), once the selfish miner publishes his private chain
to create a fork, two of his blocks BS1 and BS2 will have
transactions with expected confirmation heights E(Txj). His
truth state will be evaluated by subtracting the mean height
of all the transactions in the first block BS1 from the height
of the second block BS2 . For a selfish miner, the difference
in the block height of BS2 and the average expected height
of transactions in first block E(Txj) will be significant;
indicating that the miner withheld the block BS1 and did not
publish it to the network. The greater the length of the private
chain of selfish miner, the higher will be the value of mean
expected height of XSn − E(Txj).
The truth state of an honest miner’s block will be calculated
by subtracting the mean height of his transactions E(Tyk)
from the block height BH . Smaller difference in the block
height and average expected block height will yield to a greater
truth state. This will give advantage to the honest miner as his
block will have a higher truth state compared to the selfish
miner. In the condition of a fork F , all the peers in the network
will be required to compute the truth state for the competing
blocks of both miners, and if 51% peers comply with honesty,
the honest miner will win the race condition and selfish miner’s
private chain will be rejected. The fork state F will be resolved
and the network will resume the normal state N .
B. Circumventing Detection
An adaptive attacker may still circumvent detection as
follows. 1) Include transactions with future expected block
time in the first block to reduce the difference in the height of
the latest block and the mean expected confirmation height
of transactions in the first block. 2) Include fewer or no
transactions in each block to achieve a higher truth state than
the honest miner (Sstate ≈ XSn and Sstate < Hstate).
To counter the first technique, we add a future state param-
eter Fstate in our algorithm (line 2), that verifies if the selfish
miner has attempted to include transactions belonging to a
future block in the current block. If the selfish miner does that,
Fstate value will be less than zero, exposing the nature of
transactions in each block. In algorithm 1, if the Fstate value
is less than zero, then the private chain is rejected. To counter
the second technique, we compare the number of transactions
in the blocks of honest and selfish miner. If the average number
of transactions in the selfish miner’s blocks are less than the
honest miner’s block, it will expose that the selfish miner has
tried to artificially achieve a higher truth state by publishing
empty blocks. In our algorithm we reject the private chain if
such fraudulent behavior is detected.
C. Exceptional Cases
Since mining is a lottery-based system, there might be
instances where an honest miner finds two blocks within ten
minutes and forks the network against another honest miner.
In such a situation, the honest miner with the longer chain
deserves to win the race condition and should not be accounted
for selfish behavior. Our algorithm is flexible for such cases
as long as standard mining practices are followed. The honest
miner with the longer chain must have sizable transactions in
each block and all of them need to have expected confirmation
height close to the height of their respective block. If those
conditions are met, the honest miner will win the race con-
dition and his private chain will be accepted. Therefore, our
algorithm ensures fairness even under such circumstances as
long as the standard protocols are followed.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we introduce a form of selfish mining attack on
blockchains, that guarantees high rewards with low cost. We
outline the nature of this attack and show its profit margins
in top six cryptocurrencies. We survey the prior work and
discuss their approach and limitations. To counter this attack,
we leverage honest mining practices to devise a notion of
“truth state” for blocks during a selfish mining fork. We
assign an expected confirmation height to each transaction to
detect selfish mining behavior in the network. Our proposed
algorithm effectively deters selfish mining and encourages
fair mining practices. In future, we aim to estimate the fee
overhead of appending the estimated confirmation height in
each transaction as well as the processing overhead of applying
our algorithm at the software client.
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